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Since  Saul  Kripke’s Naming  and  Necessity,  the  view  that 
there are contingent a priori truths has been surprisingly 
widespread. In this paper, I argue against that view. My 
first point is that in general, occurrences of predicates “a 
priori” and “contingent” are implicitly relativized to some 
circumstance,  involving an agent,  a time,  a location.  My 
second point is that a priority entails necessity, whenever 
the two are relativized to the same circumstance. In other 
words, what is known to be the case a priori (by an agent 
in a circumstance) could not fail to be the case (in the same 
circumstance), hence is necessary.
§ 1.    Clarifying the Meaning of the Terms 'A Priori' and   
'Contingent'
In  Naming  and  Necessity,  Saul  Kripke  claims  that  there  are 
contingent a priori truths. In Demonstratives, David Kaplan not only 
endorses this claim, but suggests that the case is even more obvious 
if formulated with the help of indexicals. Kaplan claims that in the 
“logic” of indexicals, there are many logically valid truths that are 
not necessary. The putative existence of contingent a priori truths is 
often used as an argument for the distinction between meanings 
(Kaplan's “characters”) and contents in natural language semantics. 
This paper  originated with some general  concerns  regarding the 
character/content  distinction,  although  its  main  goal  is  to  help 
destroying the myth of the contingent a priori. The plan is to offer 
two rebuttals  of  Kripke's  proposal,  followed by two rebuttals  of 
Kaplan's proposal.
Let  me start  by  clarifying  how I  shall  understand  the  terms  a  
priori, a posteriori, necessary and contingent. A necessary truth is what 
happens to be the case and could not fail to happen be the case. A 
contingent truth is what happens to be the case but could fail to be 
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the case. An a priori  truth is what is known, independently of any 
empirical input, to be the case, while an a posteriori truth is what is 
known  to  be  the  case  only  given  some  antecedent  empirical 
knowledge.
So far, the idea that there are any a priori truths is, to say the least, 
questionable,  since,  by  definition,  a  priori  truth  presupposes  a 
cognitive agent, and that agent will de facto have a great amount of 
empirical  input  –  for  instance,  by having experience  of  her  own 
cognitive processes or thoughts. It becomes unclear, then, whether 
the agent  should ever  be able to  know anything a priori,  as her 
knowledge of any given truth may always turn out to depend on 
some  empirical  knowledge  regarding  the  cognitive  processes 
involved in the very knowledge of that truth. 
Fortunately,  it  does  not  matter  much to  the  present  discussion 
whether some knowledge depends on the empirical input coming 
from the cognitive processes involved in this knowledge. A more 
fruitful notion of a priori truth is the truth that a given agent, in a 
given  circumstance,  can  know independently  of  knowledge  that 
depends on any empirical inputs other than those that the agent has 
accumulated up to that circumstance. So on this definition, a truth 
that is a posteriori with respect to a given circumstance will become 
a  priori  with  respect  to  subsequent  circumstances  in  which  its 
knowledge is taken for granted. This is, then,  a fairly weak notion 
of a priori truth: the focus is on truth whose knowledge does not 
require any further empirical investigation. I will argue that even on 
this weak reading of 'a priori', there aren't any contingent a priori 
truths. 
I believe that the notions of relative contingency and necessity are 
also more fruitful than those of absolute contingency and necessity. 
A  reader  familiar  with  modal  logic  will  immediately  recall  the 
notion of accessibility. Something is necessary relative to a given 
circumstance when it obtains in all the circumstances accessible from 
that circumstance. For example,  consider the actual circumstance, 
in which (as of now) Paris is the capital of France.  Suppose that 
only those circumstances in which it remains true that in 2007, Paris 
is the capital  of France,  are  metaphysically accessible from these 
circumstances. Then, with respect to the actual circumstances, it is 
necessary that Paris  is the capital of France. Of course, we do not 
want to be committed to determinism, and we do want to say that 
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it could have happened that some place other than Paris were the 
capital of France. Another way of saying this is to say that the truth 
that in 2007, Paris is the capital of France,  while being necessary 
with respect to circumstances in which it is settled that Paris is the 
capital of France (as the actual circumstances), is only a contingent 
truth with respect  to  circumstances in which it is not  yet  settled 
what would be the capital of France (as, say, one century ago).
The metaphysical picture underlying the present discussion is one 
in which the accessibility relation is a partial order (as in the system 
of modal logic known as S4), rather than an equivalence relation (as 
it is in S5). This choice comes naturally once it is agreed that the 
notions of relative contingency and necessity are more fruitful than 
those of absolute contingency or necessity. For, a system such as S5, 
in which, within a given equivalence class, every point is accessible 
from every other  point,  trivializes the notion of  accessibility and 
collapses relative contingency/necessity into absolute contingency/
necessity.
If  we  agree  to  understand  the  terms  along  the  lines  sketched 
above, we should be inclined to think that if something is a priori 
then  it  is  necessary,  and if  something  is  contingent,  then  it  is  a 
posteriori. Here is why. Take any agent a, any circumstance c, and 
any truth  p. Suppose that in  c,  a's knowledge gathered prior to  c  
(empirically or otherwise) is all that a needs in order to know that p 
holds. But then, p could no longer fail to hold in c. For if p failed to 
hold in c, a's knowledge gathered prior to c would not have sufficed 
for a to know that p holds in c – which contradicts our assumption 
that in c, a knows a priori that p holds.
§ 2.    Kripke on the Contingent A Priori  
My claim, for which I have just outlined an argument, is that what 
is known a priori to be the case could not fail to be the case; in other 
words, what is known a priori is necessary. How come, then, that 
the idea that there are contingent a priori truths has been received 
with so much enthusiasm? Let me trace the issue back to Kripke:
What then, is the epistemological status of the statement ‘Stick S is one 
metre long at  t0’,  for  someone who has fixed the metric  system by 
reference to stick S? It would seem that he knows it a priori. For if he 
used stick S to fix the reference of the term ‘one metre’, then as a result 
of  this  kind  of  ‘definition’  (which  is  not  an  abbreviative  or 
synonymous  definition),  he  knows  automatically,  without  further 
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investigation, that S is one metre long. On the other hand, even if S is 
used as a standard of a metre, the metaphysical status of the statement 
‘Stick  S is  one  metre  long’  will  be  that  of  a  contingent  statement, 
provided that  ‘one metre’  is  regarded as  a  rigid  designator:  under 
appropriate stresses and strains,  heatings or coolings,  S would have 
had a length other than one metre even at t0. (Such statements as ‘The 
water boils at 100 degrees centigrade, at sea level’ can have a similar 
status.) So in this sense, there are contingent a priori truths.1
Kripke is cautious enough here to qualify his claim that there are 
contingent a priori truths with an “in this sense”. But in what sense 
exactly? Presumably, the term 'contingent' is taken in an absolute 
sense.  For,  were it relativized to circumstances in which one has 
used stick  S as a standard of a meter, then, if we assume that the 
only accessible circumstances are those in which it is settled that 
stick S has been used as a standard of a meter, then Kripke's claim 
would that, given that the length of stick  S (at  t0) is one meter, it 
may still be something other than a meter – say, 90 cm – which is 
absurd. (What is not absurd is that even if the length of stick  S is 
actually one meter,  it  might  have  happened  to  be something other 
than a meter.) On the other hand, the term 'a priori' appears to be 
implicitly relativized to those circumstances in which stick  S was 
used as a standard of a meter. 
When Kripke says that "in this sense, there are contingent a priori 
truths," the sense in which we may accept his claim implies that the 
predicates 'contingent' and 'a priori' should be relative to distinct 
circumstances. Contingency is relative to circumstances in which it 
is not settled what was used as a standard of a meter (while it is 
settled that the term 'meter' picks up the length it actually picks up, 
viz. the equivalent of 39.37 inches). A priority, on the other hand,  is 
relative to circumstances in which it is settled that specifically the 
length of stick S is used as a standard of a meter.
I shall now argue that if there is such a mismatch of relativization, 
then the idea of a priori contingent truths does not give us anything 
to be excited about. 
Here is, again, the statement under consideration:
(A) Stick S is one meter long (at t0).
When we are asked about the epistemological or the metaphysical 
status  of  the  truth  expressed  by  (A),  there  are  several  ways  to 
1 Kripke (1980: 56).
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answer  the  question,  depending  on  what  the  epistemic  and  the 
modal predicate are relative to. Here are the main options: 
1. With respect to any circumstance in which the agent has used the 
length of stick S as a standard of a meter, the truth expressed by (A) is 
a priori. (TRUE)
2. The truth expressed by (A) is a priori tout court, that is to say, for any 
agent in any circumstance. (FALSE) 
3. The truth expressed by (A) is contingent with respect to any 
circumstance in which the agent has used stick S as a standard of a 
meter. That is to say, from any such circumstance, there is an 
accessible circumstance in which stick S isn't one meter long. (FALSE) 
4. The truth expressed by (A) is contingent tout court, that is to say, there 
are circumstances  in which stick S isn't one meter long. (TRUE) 
As indicated, I take claims 1 and 4 to be correct, and 2 and 3 to be 
incorrect. On the other hand, the following strike me as correct:
2’. With respect to any circumstance in which the agent has not used 
stick S as a standard of a meter, and in which the length used as a 
standard of a meter cannot be a priori identified with the length of 
stick S, the truth expressed by (A) is a posteriori. (TRUE)
3’. With respect to any circumstance in which it is taken for granted that 
the the length of the stick S is used as a standard of a meter, the truth 
expressed by (A) is necessary. (TRUE) 
Given  the  various  ways  in  which  the  expressions  under 
consideration may be disambiguated, we seem to be entitled to any 
of the following claims:
i. The truth expressed by (A) is a priori and contingent in one sense; 
namely, in the sense of 1 and 4.
ii. The truth expressed by (A) is a priori and necessary in another sense; 
namely, in the sense of 1 and 3’. 
iii. The truth expressed by (A) is a posteriori and contingent in yet a 
third sense; namely, that of 2’ and 4.
iv. The truth expressed by (A) is a posteriori and necessary in yet a 
fourth sense; namely, that of 2’ and 3’. 
To be sure, it is difficult to devise a situation in which one would 
simply say that the truth of (A) is a posteriori and necessary, as in 
iv.  The difficulty lies in the fact that 'a posteriori'  and 'necessary' 
would have to be implicitly relativized to distinct and, moreover, 
incompatible circumstances. By parity of reasoning, i should not be 
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much better, given that the epistemic and the modal predicate are 
again relativized to  distinct  circumstances.  The most appropriate 
thing to say is that the truth expressed by (A) is neither a priori tout  
court  nor necessary  tout court,  and that  it  is a priori  to the same 
extent to which it is necessary.
§ 3.    One More Attempt (on Kripke's Behalf)  
At this point, one might object that I have simply missed Kripke’s 
point. For, consider a circumstance, call it Circ, in which the agent 
has used the length of stick S as a standard of a meter; that is to say, 
a circumstance in which the expression “one meter” picks out as its 
reference the actual length of stick S in that circumstance. Suppose 
that in Circ, stick S is a bit longer than a meter, say, 40 inches (recall 
that 1m is 39.37in). What is, then, the epistemic status of the truth 
expressed by (A) with respect to Circ? One might want to say that it 
is an a priori  truth,  since in Circ,  the meter  has been defined as 
being  the  length  of  stick  S (hence  'meter'  there  stands  for  40in, 
rather than 39.37) But one might also want to say that (A) expresses 
something that is false with respect to Circ, since, after all, stick S in 
Circ is 40 inches long, which is a bit more than a meter. But then, 
one might continue, this mustmean that the truth expressed by (A) 
(in  the  original  setting)  is  only  contingent,  given  that  there  are 
circumstances, such as Circ, in which it does not hold (even though 
stick  S has been used there,  too,  as a standard of a meter).  And 
from this it would follow that, contrary to what I have suggested, 
that claim 3 is true:    
3.  The truth expressed by (A) is contingent with respect to any circum-
stance in which the agent has used stick S as a standard of a meter. 
The reasoning that I have sketched is problematic. To see why, let 
me first articulate two assumptions on which it relies:
a1. The truth expressed by (A) is a priori with respect to 
circumstance C iffdef: 
if sentence (A) were uttered in C, then any agent in C 
would know a priori that that utterance of (A) expresses a 
truth.
a2. The truth expressed by (A) is contingent with respect to 
circumstance C iffdef:
sentence (A), as uttered in the actual circumstances, 
expresses something that correctly characterizes the actual 
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circumstances, while incorrectly characterizing some 
circumstance accessible from C.
In  other  words,  according  to  this  view,  when  we  ask  for  the 
epistemic status of  a truth expressed by a sentence, with respect to 
a circumstance, we consider the sentence as if it had been uttered in 
that circumstance. But when we ask for the metaphysical status of a 
truth expressed by a sentence, with respect to some circumstance, 
we consider the sentence as actually uttered, and we ask whether 
the other circumstance is correctly characterized by this utterance 
here and now. So again, there is a mismatch between what one is 
talking  about  when  inquiring  about  the  epistemic  vs.  the  meta-
physical  status  of  "the  truth  expressed  by  (A)."  To  repair  the 
mismatch, one might want want to replace  assumption a2 with the 
following one:
a3. The truth expressed by (A) is contingent with respect to 
circumstance C iffdef: 
sentence (A), as uttered in C, characterizes C correctly, 
while incorrectly characterizing some circumstance 
accessible from C.
Given a3, Circ is not a circumstance with respect to which the truth 
expressed by (A)  is at the same time a priori and contingent, and, 
furthermore, it is unclear how there could be such a circumstance, if 
we assume that once it is settled that the length of stick S (at time t0) 
was used as a standard of a meter, then it remains true, in all the 
accessible circumstances, that is was used as a standard of a meter.
The idea that one can have an a priori contingent truth relative to 
some particular circumstance may thus be interpreted in two ways. 
On the more straightforward interpretation, provided by a1 and a3, 
we get the startling, if not outright contradictory claim that one and 
the same truth is known, independently of empirical input, to be 
the case, and may still fail to be the case in that same circumstance 
in which it is known a priori. On the other interpretation, provided 
by a1 and a2, the idea seems to be that there is a single truth that is a 
priori  and contingent.  But  as  it  turns  out,  a2 is  about  the  truth 
expressed by a sentence uttered in the actual circumstances, while 
a1 is about what is expressed by a sentence hypothetically uttered 
in a different circumstance. Since those utterances express different 
truths, there is no single truth that may be said to be both a priori 
and contingent.
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§ 4.    Kaplan on the Contingent A Priori  
David Kaplan has carried Kripke’s idea of the contingent a priori 
into the realm of logic. Kaplan’s suggestion is that there are logical 
truths that are contingent:
I wish to parallel [Kripke’s] remarks on disconnecting the a priori and 
the  necessary.  The form of  a  prioricity  that  I  will  discuss  is  that  of 
logical truth (in the logic of demonstratives)... A truth of the logic of 
demonstratives, like “I am here now” need not be necessary. There are 
many such cases of logical truths which are not necessary. (1989: 538)
Kaplan focuses on allegedly logical yet contingent truths expressed 
by statements of the sentence “I am here now.” And if, as seems 
plausible, logical truths are knowable a priori, then this would give 
us another instance of the contingent a priori. 
Kaplan's  example  raises  interesting  issues  of  its  own,  some  of 
which would take us astray in our discussion. Let me therefore try 
to capture Kaplan’s insights directly on the meter-example.
There appear to be two ways of “disconnecting the a priori and 
the necessary.” One is to say that the same kind of entity is a priori 
or a posteriori and necessary or contingent, and that among those 
entities, some are at the same time a priori and contingent. This is 
the suggestion that we have been examining previously. We have 
assumed that what is or is not the case, what could or could not 
have  failed  to  be  the  case,  and  what  is  known,  a  priori  or  a 
posteriori, to be or not to be the case, are always the same sort of 
entities (viz. "truths"). I hope to have shown that if it makes sense to 
say of something that it is a priori and contingent, it makes sense 
only  provided  that  the  predicates  'a  priori'  and  'contingent'  are 
implicitly relativized to distinct parameters.
The other way of disconnecting the a priori and the necessary is to 
say that the entities that a priori or a posteriori are not the same as 
those  that  are  necessary  or  contingent.  That  is,  epistemic  and 
metaphysical predicates would apply to different  sorts  of things. 
This is what Kaplan seems to be suggesting when he writes:
The bearers of logical truth and of contingency are different entities. It 
is the character that is logically true, producing a true content in every 
context. But it is the content that is contingent or necessary (1989: 530).
Let us apply Kaplan's idea to our working example. Reconsider:
(A) Stick S is one meter long (at t0).
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Furthermore,  let  us  assume  that  the  following  is  a  faithful 
paraphrase of A: 
(A1) The length (at t0) of stick S  = one meter.
Kaplan would say that  (A1) expresses a certain content.  Call  this 
content  p.  Now,  p does not say that a meter is identical to itself. 
Rather,  p says  that  the  relation  of  being  the  same  length  obtains 
between a meter and stick S at time t0. So, consider someone who 
has used the length of stick S at time t0 as a standard of a meter. For 
that person, “a meter” will roughly mean the same as “the  actual  
length of stick S (at t0).” We may use Kaplan’s special device, dthat, 
to indicate that the embedded condition merely serves to single out 
the thing that actually satisfies that condition uniquely. Statement 
(A1) may be paraphrased, then, as follows: 
(A2) The length at t0 of stick S = dthat(the length at t0 of stick S).
Here is the gist of Kaplan’s proposal. The content expressed by (A2) 
is that the relation of being the same length obtains between the 
meter  itself  (which  is  what  the  dthat-expression  pick  out  as  its 
reference)  and stick  S.  This content  is contingent,  since there are 
possible circumstances in which stick S is longer or shorter than a 
meter.  However,  the  character of  (A2),  by  means  of  which  the 
content comes to be expressed, can only express something that is 
actually the case, and, in this respect, the sentence in (A2) is logically 
true, and its character is "a priori." One might thus want to say that 
the truth expressed by (A2) is contingent (because the content is) and 
a priori (because the character is).
My concern is that it is not clear how the notion of an a priori 
truth, in the sense of a truth known independently of any empirical 
input, is supposed to apply to characters. For, characters are merely 
routes from a sentence in a context to its content, while contents are 
supposed to  stand for  that  which is believed or  known. Indeed, 
Kaplan  himself  introduced  an  "Epistemic  Principle"  that  says: 
"Object of thoughts = Contents" (Kaplan 1989: 530).
One might find the following definition promising:
a4. A character is a priori iffdef: 
independently of any empirical knowledge (other than 
the required knowledge of language) any agent knows 
that if sentence A has that character, then the content 
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expressed by any utterance of A obtains in the 
circumstances in which the utterance is made.
On this interpretation, to say that a character is a priori amounts, 
in fact, to saying that a certain content that is about this character is 
known to be the  case independently of any empirical knowledge 
(other than the required knowledge of language). The content that 
is a priori is the content that says that any utterance of a sentence 
with the character at stake expresses a content that obtains in the 
circumstances of the utterance. But what follows from this is that 
the predicates 'a priori' and 'necessary' are no longer disconnected 
in virtue of holding of different sorts of entities. For, characters are 
a priori only in a derivative sense, while what is in fact a priori are 
contents about characters.  What is more,  such "a priori"  contents 
are not a priori in any fruitful sense, because they depend on the 
knowledge of what the given expressions mean. More importantly, 
there  is  no  single  content  that  can  be  known  independently  of 
experience and yet fail to be the case, hence there is nothing at the 
same time a priori and contingent.
§ 5.    One More Attempt (on Kaplan's Behalf)  
Adherents to Kaplan’s proposal might acknowledge that  there is 
nothing  contingent  and  a  priori,  in  the  sense  that  there  are  no 
contents at the same time contingent and a priori. But they might 
persist on the idea that there are “a priori characters,” i.e. characters 
that generate contingent contents, but with which we may associate 
a priori knowable contents, such as the content that says that any 
utterance of a sentence with that character expresses a content that 
obtains  in  the  circumstances  of  utterance.  This  very  idea,  they 
might continue,  is a  startling result  per  se,  since it  suggests  that 
contingent truths can be known under a priori characters.2 
I  want  to  show that  this  idea  is  pointless.  I  will  argue  that  in 
Kaplan’s framework,  any contingent content that can be known at 
all  can  be  known  under  an  a  priori  character.  And  if  every 
contingent  truth  is an instance  of  the contingent  a  priori,  in the 
sense  that  the contingent  content  is  knowable under  an a  priori 
character,  the idea of  the  contingent a priori  becomes trivial.  So 
here comes the argument.
2 Characters are closely related to modes of presentation. The idea of knowing something 
"under" a character comes from the idea that knowledge, and cognitive processes in 
general, are mediated by modes of presentation.
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Consider  some  contingent  content  that  says  that  object  b has 
property  P,  noted  P(b).  Suppose that in circumstance  c  at time  t, 
agent  a comes to know that  P(b) is the case, and that he comes to 
know it under the straightforward character of “b has P.” The same 
content, P(b), will be expressed by the following sentence:
(1) Dthat(the only object such that in c at t, a comes to know that 
it has P) has P.
The content expressed by (1) is, to be sure, contingent. On the other 
hand, it takes little to realize that the character of (1) is “a priori,” 
since it always yields a content that obtains in the circumstances in 
which the sentences is uttered.3 
The  lesson  to  be  drawn  is  that  there  is  nothing  illuminating 
about  contingent  contents  that  can  be  known  "under  a  priori 
characters." The reason is that the features of the a priori associated 
with such characters are, in fact,  dissociated from their contingent 
contents. For, if I know that P(b), then I can also know it under an a 
priori  character,  because  I  know,  independently  of  empirical 
knowledge (other than the required knowledge of language) that if 
the sentence in (1) is uttered, its content (whenever it expresses one) 
will  obtain  in  that  circumstance.  The  "meta-content,"  admittedly 
known a priori, is about the character of (1), while the contingent 
content that this character expresses is about object b and property 
P.
I have just shown how any content that ascribes a property to an 
object and that can come to be known, can subsequently be known 
under an a priori character. It is easy to generalize this strategy to 
show that any content that can come to be known, can subsequently 
be known under an a priori character, thereby showing the idea of 
contingent  content  knowable  "under  a  priori  character"  to  be  of 
little interest. 
§ 6.    Conclusion  
I have argued against the contingent a priori by making the fairly 
obvious  point  that  what  is  known  a  priori  by  an  agent  in  a 
circumstance cannot fail to be the case in that circumstance. It only 
makes  sense  to  talk  of  the  contingent  a  priori  if  the  predicates 
3 Note that if the sentence in (1) is used in a context in which a does not come to know 
that P(b), no content will be expressed. But my claim is that any content that can come to 
be known can subsequently be known under an a priori character.
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'contingent'  and  'a  priori'  are  implicitly  relativized  to  distinct 
parameters. But if so, then the idea that there are contingent a priori 
truths  gives  us  nothing  to  be  excited  about,  and  is  likelier  to 
confuse  than to illuminate.4
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